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There are different ways of conceptualizing the relationship between religion and politics in 
twentieth-century China. One is to examine the religious policies of the state or political 
organizations. In this case, the political and the religious are treated as more or less autonomous 
spheres.1 Another is to look at the overlap between the two, in particular at the ways that politics 
became ‘religionized.’ This approach has evolved into a burgeoning field of research over the past 
two decades, with studies coming under different labels such as ‘political ritual,’ ‘political (or 
personality) cult’ or ‘political religion.’2 Of these, ‘political religion’ goes furthest in undermining the 
binary conceptualization of religion and its ‘other’ as diametrically opposed categories.3 If the process 
of modern state-building, in China as elsewhere, is to be linked to processes of secularization,4 then 
what constitutes the secular needs to be complicated. For some of the modern political ideologies that 
emerged in early twentieth-century China not only underpinned state expansion, but impinged on the 
creation of what Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer have recently referred to as “a self-consciously 
‘religious’ field,” which they argue was to a considerable extent a political project.5 While it makes 
sense to conceptualize the emerging forms of mass politics, authoritarianism and totalitarianism as 
new “affective regimes”6 competing with the established ones of religion, this alone is not sufficient. 
For it glosses over the stunning parallels between totalizing ideologies and religion, notwithstanding 
the fact that the former––in an irony of dialectics––were often adamantly anti-religious.7 The concept 
of political religion can help clarify how the modernizing state as well as modern political 
organizations not only impacted on the religious field, but how their prescriptive ideologies also 
became part of that field and must therefore be studied as religious phenomena in their own right. 
This is not to say that political religion is the same thing as religion proper. Indeed, this is a 
matter of debate amongst proponents of the concept, with some scholars using the religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  See, for example, Ashiwa and Wank (2009), Poon (2011), Yang (2008), Wang Xiaoming (2003), Zha Shijie 
(1993), Cohen (1992), Duara (1991), Luo Zhufeng (1991). 
2  E. g. Aijmer (1996), Leese (2011), Apter (2005), Mitter (2008). 
3  Cf. Asad (2003), p. 22, and Knecht and Feuchter (2008), pp. 14-16. 
4  Cf. Yang (2008), pp. 6-7. 
5  Goossaert and Palmer (2011), pp. 10-11. Note how this is a marked departure from Bourdieu, who conceives 
of the political and religious fields as relatively autonomous to one another. Cf. Bourdieu (1971, 2009). 
6  I borrow this term from Nedostup (2009), pp. 227-28. 
7  See Ryklin (2008), esp. pp. 31-33; Riegel (2008), pp. 62-63. 
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terminology only metaphorically or by way of analogy, while others argue that political ideologies 
constitute a new form of religiosity based on modern manifestations of the sacred.8 The German-born 
political scientist Eric Voegelin (1901-1985), one of the founding fathers of the concept, holds that the 
state is not simply a secular institution and that some of its features must be defined as religious. 
Tracing the development of political religion from antiquity to Communism and Fascism in the 1930s, 
Voegelin regards modern political religions as strictly inner-worldly, which distinguishes them from 
at the ‘trans-worldly’ redemptive religions (though not necessarily from non-redemptive religions). 
Political religions are thus at the same time a product of secularization and an attempt to overcome it.9 
Following the dissolution of the Christian ecclesia, they seek to create a perfect inner-worldly 
community by offering a renewal that Voegelin calls “apocalyptic,” by which term he refers to a 
perceived need to overcome the forces of evil (be they the bourgeoisie, supposedly inferior races or 
others) as a prerequisite to attaining social redemption.10  
This apocalyptic dimension is equivalent to what students of Fascism have called 
‘palingenesis’: the notion of a (national) rebirth from a state of crisis, which derives from Christian 
soteriology, but can likewise be applied to matters secular.11 It is important to note, however, that this 
utopian dimension of political religion, which promises the creation of an idealized community 
through an epic struggle, is not incompatible with claims to scientific rationality. In fact, as Voegelin 
has argued, such modern “apocalyptic revelations” often pretend to be scientific, while in his view 
they are in fact “myths” relying on the emotional mobilization of the masses.12 Such mobilization is 
achieved through the focus on a political leader, who takes the place of the godhead, through the 
persuasive deployment of rituals and symbols, through expressions of faith in the leader and his 
teaching and finally through the dissemination of a new revolutionary morality that includes self-
examination and, if necessary, self-sacrifice.13 
It is obvious that while some of the above elements were not unknown in pre-modern China, 
others––in particular a faith-based rhetoric and a Christianity-based soteriological concept––were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  For the former cf. Aron (1957) and the otherwise useful chapter by Riegel (1999); for the latter Gentile 
(2006). 
9  Voegelin (2008), pp. 24-33. 
10  Ibid., pp. 50-52 and 59-61. 
11  Griffin (1991), pp. 32-36; cf. also Passmore (2002), p. 20. 
12  Voegelin (2008), pp. 61-63. Cf., however Mitter (2008), who argues that Maoism (and by implication the 
Guomindang, which preceded it) cannot be classified as a political religion because unlike Fascism and the 
Japanese right in the Shōwa period, it did not seek to overcome reason. This is to gloss over the undoubtedly 
irrational dimension of Communism (not only in its Chinese form) and would leave right-wing movements 
as the only political religions. 
13  Voegelin (2008), pp. 64-69; for the moral and ascetic dimension see also Goossaert and Palmer (2011), p. 
169.  
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unfamiliar in a country where the focus traditionally was not on believing, but on ‘doing’ religion.14 
Political religion in China is thus not only a modern concept, it is also bound up with processes of 
globalization.  
In this essay, I shall examine the global dimension of political religions in China, applying a 
longitudinal section through the twentieth century. I will embed the phases that can be most easily 
identified as having been politically religious––the rule of the National Party or Guomindang ??? 
(GMD, 1925-1949) and that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao 
Zedong ??? (1941-1976)––within the broader intellectual and political trends as well as their 
global connotations. My argument is that firstly, the emergence of political religion in China can be 
interpreted as a constitutive element of a double globalizing process: directly through Moscow’s 
strategy of Communist world revolution and both directly and indirectly through the global spread of 
Christianity––it must be borne in mind that the Soviet sacralization of the political, as exemplified in 
the cult of Lenin, owed a great deal to the Christian religion.15 Despite being an emulation of Soviet 
beliefs and practices, the cult of Sun Yatsen (usually referred to in Chinese as Sun Zhongshan ???
, 1866-1925), my first major case study, was part of a global wave of totalitarian movements and 
regimes sharing features of political religion. But secondly, this was not a one-way process. As my 
second case study shows, China’s ideological and political leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976) became 
an icon outside China in the 1960s and early 1970s, contributing to the emergence of a ‘global 
moment’ by inspiring student protests in Europe as much as revolutionary insurgents across the Third 
World.16 Finally, although it would appear that forms of political religion were off the CCP’s agenda 
following Mao’s death, I show that vestiges of political religion emerged in new contexts, providing 
guidance in a rapidly shifting, fluid and realigning world.  
 
1. Global Factors in the Emergence of Political Religion in China 
 
The socio-political transformation of China at the turn of the twentieth century conformed to 
a long-term global trend identified by the sociologist Reinhard Bendix (1916-1991) in the late 1970s: 
the transition from monarchical rule legitimized by religious sanction to forms of political authority 
held in the name of the people.17 Such authority does not have to be democratic; what is important is 
that “unless measures are taken to prevent it, rulers and ruled alike must advance their claims in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  See Chau (2011). 
15  See Ryklin (2008).  
16  For the term ‘global moment’ see Conrad and Sachsenmaier (2007), pp. 12-16. 
17  Bendix (1980), pp. 4-10. Note that the word ‘global’ is not part of Bendix’s vocabulary (a search engine 
yields only one hit), but he uses the roughly equivalent term ‘universal’ repeatedly throughout the volume. 
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public and hence with an eye to public reactions that are likely to follow.”18 In China, the gradual shift 
towards constitutional monarchy after 1901 and, more importantly, the abrupt demise of the Qing 
dynasty in 1911/12 left a vacuum that was waiting to be filled with new concepts able to achieve 
domestic stability and international equality for a country still attempting to extricate itself from the 
fetters of imperialism. 
As a result, the connection between religion and politics that had been the bedrock of late 
Imperial China underwent a major shift. Up until the late nineteenth century, the emperor was the 
head and high priest of state religion, with officials on each rung of the bureaucratic ladder acting as 
lesser priests by making regular sacrifices to specific deities. 19 Although its purpose was the 
maintenance of order and stability in the empire, it clearly involved a transcendent dimension that 
consisted in what the anthropologist Jordan Paper, pointing to a common theme underlying the 
generally pluralistic and heterogeneous religious landscape in China, has identified as the ritual core 
of Chinese religion(s): the exchange of sacrifices for protection.20 Hence it can be classified as inner-
worldly, but not as redemptive. When the Qing dynasty embarked on a constitutional programme in 
the last decade of its rule, it attempted to back this up by elevating the sacrifices for Confucius, who 
was to become the centrepiece of a dynastic patriotism. What is important here is not so much that 
this attempt at rallying the population behind the dynasty fell short of its objective. Rather, it is that 
although the elevation of the great sage marked a rupture with the established order of state religion, 
geared towards the emerging concepts of nationalism and citizenship,21 it derived from a time-
honoured precedent and did not focus – as political religions would later do – on a contemporary 
leader. 
However, the same global intellectual, cultural and social currents that the Qing dynasty 
sought to address through innovative forms of worship, pulled China into a different direction 
altogether. Modern politico-scientific concepts such as (social) Darwinism, liberalism, nationalism 
and communism began to be received by China’s emerging intelligentsia through the translations of 
Yan Fu ?? (1853-1921) and others.22 This was part of a wider transformation: the creation of a 
modern political, social and scientific language, based first on missionary translations and since about 
1895––the year of Qing China’s crushing defeat at the hands of Japan––on the indirect adoption of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Ibid., p. 8. 
19  Feuchtwang (1978), especially pp. 106-07. For the sake of simplicity, I will not engage here in a discussion 
about the term ‘religion’ in China, nor about the concern for orthodoxy and the religious policy of the Ming 
and Qing dynasties. 
20  Paper (1995), pp. 26, 47. For the concept of religious landscape and its plurality, see Goossaert and Palmer 
(2011). 
21  See Kuo Ya-pei (2008); Harrison (2001), pp. 90-94. 
22  Schwartz 1964. 
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modern terms by way of Japanese translations of ‘Western’ texts.23 The first years of the twentieth 
century also saw a new rhetoric of nationalism emerge, centred around terms such as the ‘partition’ 
(guafen ??) of China, its ‘existence or downfall’ (cunwang ??), the necessity to ‘save the nation’ 
(jiuguo ??), the vilification of all who betrayed or, literally, ‘sold the country’ (maiguo ??) and 
finally, the idea of ‘national humiliation’ (guochi ??) as a powerful metaphor for China’s 
domination by ‘Western’ imperialism.24 This was accompanied by a discourse on martyrdom as well 
as an evolving culture of largely non-violent protest that for the first time manifested itself on a large 
scale during the anti-American protests of 1905. The latter included the occupation (or indeed the 
creation) of symbolic spaces, demonstrations, boycotts, public telegrams and other forms of 
agitation.25 As in other colonies and semi-colonies across the globe, nationalism became a powerful 
instrument for resisting the imperialists and claiming and asserting independence. 
Accordingly, the nation was the first inner-worldly political object to become sacralized. 
Early nationalism also revealed the apocalyptical dimension of a secular ideology for the first time in 
Chinese politics, as the existence of the Chinese nation had to be defended not only against 
imperialism, but also against the Manchu Qing ? dynasty. For example, in his Wangguo pian ??? 
(Essay on the downfall of the nation), published in 1904/05, Chen Duxiu ??? (1879-1942) 
juxtaposes the traditional change of an Imperial dynasty to the downfall of the Chinese nation-state. 
According to him, China “already counts as a perishing country in the world” because its territory, 
economic rights and sovereignty had been seized by foreigners.26 For Chen, territory in particular is 
“the first important thing for a state… Today, no nation-state in the world, can cede an inch of its 
sacred and inviolable territory to other people.”27 
With its borrowing of religious language, its rhetoric of apocalypse and palingenesis and its 
culture of practical activism, early Chinese nationalism bears some similarities to later, full-fledged 
forms of political religion. Where it differs––and what disqualifies it as a political religion in the strict 
sense of the term––is its lack of focus of worship, organizational structure and clearly articulated 
faith. From the late Qing through the early Republic, nationalism was ideologically heterogeneous and 
structurally dispersed, despite the impressive mass demonstrations between 1905 and the mid-1920s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  For this shift see Elman (2005), especially p. 395; for the wider context also the contributions in Lackner and 
Vittinghoff (2004). 
24  Rankin (2002), p. 339; Cohen (2003). 
25  See, among others, Rankin (2002), pp. 335-38; Lee (2009); Zhou Yongming (2006), Gerth (1998). 
26  Chen Duxiu (n.d.), ch. 1. The original text appeared in various instalments in the periodical Anhui suhua bao 
???????
27  Ibid., ch. 2. 
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that featured students as their organizational backbone.28 Such bottom-up approaches were balanced 
by successive Republican governments’ attempts to create a modern citizenry conforming to arguably 
global but definitely ‘Western’-inspired cultural standards. The political leadership introduced 
political symbols such as the five-colour flag or the Gregorian calendar (and with it national holidays) 
and propagated ‘civilized’ forms of clothing and etiquette.29 But these too fell short of creating a 
unified political faith or organization. 
By the late 1910s, it had become clear that China was still being denied its rightful place in 
the world-wide system of nation-states. What made the Chinese public painfully aware of this was not 
only the fragmentation of the Republican polity into fiefdoms controlled by warlords. It was also the 
disappointing outcome of what Erez Manela has called the ‘Wilsonian moment,’ a global conjunction 
in which China played no small part.30 Educated Chinese had been enthused by US president 
Woodrow Wilson’s (1856-1924) famous Fourteen Points, proclaimed in January 1918 because they 
seemed to usher in an era of national self-determination that would put an end to imperialism in 
China. Although it is by no means certain that Wilson knowingly let China down,31 the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919 not only failed to respond to China’s attempt at a total liquidation of imperialist 
privileges, it also awarded the former German colony of Kiaochow (Jiaozhou ??) to Japan. Chinese 
protests against this diplomatic failure of their political representatives merged with an ongoing 
project of cultural rejuvenation to form the May Fourth movement of 1919.  
It is impossible to go into detail here; what is important is that both the negative results of the 
global Wilsonian moment and the Chinese nationalist response to it were catalysts in the development 
of political religion in China. The former enabled alliances between governments viewing themselves 
as ‘losers’ of the peace process. The May Fourth movement, on the other hand, marked the watershed 
between more liberal visions of the nation-state and society and a new era of mass politics in China 
that was dominated by monopolistic parties. Although the intellectual leaders of the movement 
extolled scientific rationalities, their youthful followers were also driven by a Romanticist sense of the 
ego.32 It was at this decisive moment (and crisis of the new political system), and in the wake of the 
National Revolution of the mid-1920s, that China’s interactions with the wider world spawned full-
fledged political religions. 
 
2. The Guomindang and the Cult of Sun Yatsen 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Zarrow (2005), p. 122. 
29  Harrison (2000), pp. 49-92; Zarrow (2012), pp. 216-21. 
30  See Manela (2007). 
31  See Elleman (2002). 
32  See Mitter (2004), pp. 120-23. 
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The National Party or Guomindang (GMD) was the first political organization to institute a 
comprehensive political religion in China. In this process, the alliance between the Nationalist leader 
Sun Yatsen and the Soviet Union served as the catalyst that transformed the Nationalists “from a 
collection of followers of a national hero to a highly organized party of disciplined individuals, united 
by the acceptance of a common revolutionary program.”33 This sea change in organization outlasted 
the GMD’s Soviet connection and the simultaneous united front with the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) after both eventually broke up in 1927. 
From the Bolshevik perspective, the alliance with the GMD, then based in Canton 
(Guangzhou ??) in South China, was part of a strategy of world revolution, although the Soviet 
government simultaneously pursued an interest-driven policy of bilateral negotiations with the feeble 
central government in Beijing. In order to reach out to revolutionary organizations in other countries, 
the Bolsheviks had founded the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 as its global 
revolutionary arm. The Comintern was tightly controlled by the Politburo of the Russian (since 1922: 
Soviet) Communist Party, and its representatives in China cooperated closely with Soviet diplomats. 
After the hopes for a success of Communist revolutions in Western Europe had foundered, the 
strategy of the Comintern consisted in supporting national-revolutionary movements at the colonial 
and semi-colonial periphery and especially in the ‘East’ as a means of undermining imperialism 
(defined as the highest stage of capitalism by Lenin), building up a ‘reserve’ for world revolution and 
winning ‘natural’ allies for revolutionary Russia. Although nationalist liberation movements were 
mostly classified as bourgeois-democratic, the Soviet leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924) and 
others initially toyed with the idea that ‘Eastern’ countries might directly advance to socialism, 
bypassing the capitalist stage.34 
The alliance between the GMD and the Soviet Union/Comintern was not free of tensions, as 
Sun Yatsen insisted on putting the National Party on an independent footing. Nevertheless, the 
Comintern representatives in China made fundamental contributions to the reconstruction of the party: 
They made Sun and the GMD aware of the value of centralized propaganda work.35 They reorganized 
the party into a hierarchical apparatus based on the principle of democratic centralism. They created a 
new type of army that was under party control, heavily ideologized and active in propaganda work.36 
And in so doing, they provided the context for Sun’s reformulating his ideology, the Three People’s 
Principles (Sanminzhuyi ????), in a series of lectures which for all their lack of coherence were 
his most systematic attempt at creating a political platform. These reflected themselves a mixture of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Leng and Palmer (1976), p. 76. 
34  Kuo Heng-yü et al. (1996), pp. 27-52; Pantsov (2002), pp. 33-36; Riegel (1999), pp. 335-36. For the Soviet 
Union’s bilateral China policy cf. Elleman (1997). 
35  Bastid-Bruguière (2002), pp. 17-23. 
36  Li Yuzhen (1996), pp. 267-88; Bergère (1994), pp. 384-94. 
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global influences reaching from Soviet und liberal American as well as Christian writings to 
observations on empires and colonies.37 In the opening passage of his first lecture, Sun defined his 
ideology as follows: “Using the simplest definition, we can say that the Three People’s Principles are 
the principles of saving the nation-state. What is a principle? A principle is an idea, a belief (xinyang 
??) and a force.”38 Sun thus emphasized the apocalyptic character of the national revolution; at the 
same, this passage is indicative of how a religious vocabulary found its way into the political language 
of China.39 In the following years it began to permeate the GMD texts; for example, the Three 
People’s Principles are occasionally referred to as a “Gospel” (fuyin ??) in which people “believed” 
(xin ?), the latter term being ubiquitous; party members and adherents of the Nationalists called 
themselves “adherents” or “disciples” (xintu ??, an explicitly Christian term) of Sun’s doctrine.40 
The National Revolution of 1925-1928 which gave the Guomindang nominal control over 
(almost) the entire Chinese territory, a mixture of military campaigns and the largest mass movement 
China had seen to date, bore out this pattern. Public agitation was directed at warlords and foreign 
imperialists (including Christian missionaries); the latter were not only vilified, but sometimes 
demonized outright, although the GMD leadership and its Soviet allies may have sought to curb 
excesses so as not to precipitate a conflict with the Western powers.41 Sun Yat-sen’s untimely death in 
March 1925 prevented him to witness this; even as the National Revolution was still ongoing, the 
GMD began to use his ritualized memory as the focal point that would enhance the legitimacy of the 
new regime. 
There is no indication that the Comintern advisers directly influenced the emergence of the 
personality cult around Sun, although the Soviet Union contributed to it by calling its newly 
established training institute for GMD and CCP cadres in Moscow Sun Yatsen University. Between 
1925 and 1928 (two years before it was eventually closed), the University produced around 600 
graduates, with both parties accounting for roughly half of them each.42 In all probability, however, 
the construction of Sun Yatsen as a symbol of the new regime began as an attempt by the GMD to tap 
into spontaneous commemorative activities springing up locally in the wake of the leader’s death. 
Such activities probably drew on Sun’s positive image with the Chinese public; he had been respected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  For a more detailed analysis, see Wells (2001); Bergère (1994), pp. 400-50. 
38  Sun Zhongshan (2000), p. 1. 
39  See Nedostup (2007), p. 29. 
40  A random sample of texts includes Wu Keji ??? to National Goverment, 26 January 1926, ZDELD 19, 
Guangzhou Guomin Zhengfu ??????, no. 417; “Guangzhou tebieshi dongbu ershiqi nian eryue zhi 
ershiba nian siyue gongzuo baogao?????????????????????????,” ZDELD 
11-2, 1029; “Zongli danchen jinian biaoyu” (1928), p. 55. Cf. already Nedostup (2007), p. 29. 
41  Klein (2014), pp. 139-44; Murdock (2006), pp. 165-71. 
42  Riegel (1999), pp. 339-40; Sheng Yueh (1971), p. 41. 
59	  
	  
as one of very few incorrupt politicians.43 Before long, however, the GMD took control and 
established a host of activities, some of them one-off events, others permanent and some regular: A 
lavish memorial service for Sun was held after his death. Four years later, his remains were 
transported in state and with large crowds turning up along the railway tracks from Beijing to his 
chosen resting place at Nanjing ??. There, his remains were transferred in solemn procession to a 
grandiose mausoleum at Purple Mountain (Zijinshan ???), which was reminiscent both of the 
Hongwu ?? Emperor of the Ming ? Dynasty (ruled 1368-1398), whose tomb is nearby, and––in 
conscious emulation––of Lenin. 44  In Guangzhou, a large memorial hall was erected in 
commemoration of Sun; all over China, streets and urban districts, parks, schools and academic 
institutions, were named after him, as was his birthplace, the district and town of Xiangshan ??, 
which now became Zhongshan ??. In 1927 and 1930 respectively, the anniversaries of Sun’s birth 
and death joined the calendar of Nationalist holidays, while two other important holidays––10 
October as the anniversary of the 1911 revolution and Gregorian New Year as the founding date of 
the Republic––largely centred on Sun’s image as well as his ideology. That dates prior to 1912 were 
converted from the old lunisolar calendar to the Gregorian one indicates that the commemoration of 
Sun was bound up with the GMD’s attempts at making China part of global modernity.45 Finally, 
honorific titles were bestowed on Sun. In the years following his death, he was referred to as the 
zongli ?? or Premier––a title he had assumed in 1924 and which also refers to heads of 
government––until in 1940, he was canonized as the ‘Father of the Nation’ (guofu ??).46 
Amongst these varied activities, the Weekly Remembrance of the Party held a special place, 
partly because of its weekly rhythm and partly owing to the concentration of symbols. It was to be 
held every Monday morning in all party branches, government offices, army units, schools and 
universities. It was thus not a mass ritual, despite being transmitted to a wider public by intensive 
press coverage, radio broadcasts and through ‘enlarged’ (kuoda ??) ceremonies directed at mass 
audiences of several thousand people.47 The ritual came in a number of simple steps:48 At the 
beginning, the assembly would rise (or stand, if there were no seats available) in a respectful attitude. 
The second step, formally introduced in 1933 but informally practiced since 1929, was the singing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Chen Yunqian (2005), pp. 64-65; for Sun’s public image see Schiffrin (1980), p. 216.  
44  Harrison (2000), pp. 133-44 and 207-30; Wang Liping (1996); Musgrove (2007). 
45  Chen Yunqian (2009), pp. 325-410; Poon (2011), pp. 94-97; Nedostup (2007), pp. 44-48. For the global 
spread of the Gregorian calendar see Macey (2010), p. 34. 
46  Bergère (1994), p. 470. 
47  Chen Yunqian (2005), pp. 69-70. 
48  “Jinianzhou tiaoli” (1926), pp. 1-2. For a revised version cf. Zhonghua Minguo fagui daquan (1936), p. 
5721. 
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the party anthem (on a text by Sun himself), which in 1943 became the national anthem of the 
Republic of China (and is still in use on Taiwan today).49 Next, participants made three bows facing 
the image of Sun Yat-sen (and since 1937 to the party and national flags).50 This would be followed 
by a reading of Sun’s Last Will and Testament, a text actually drafted on Sun’s deathbed by his long-
time associate Wang Jingwei ??? (1883-1944). Next, participants would again face Sun’s image 
and observe three minutes of silence, followed by a political report, which in 1930 was changed to a 
lecture on Sun’s teaching or a work report. After that, the ceremony would be officially concluded.  
Each element of the ritual was fraught with meaning. The reading of Sun’s testament 
contained an apocalyptic dimension, as Sun declared that the revolution had not yet been completed 
and exhorted his comrades (tongzhi ??) to let them be guided by his writings and continue to strive 
for (ultimate) victory. It also addressed China’s role in the world in defining as Sun’s political 
objective the liberty and international equality of the Republic; to attain this objective, his followers 
would have to “unite with the peoples of the world that treat us on an equal footing, so as to pursue 
the common fight.”51 By the same token, the bow (jugong ??) was one of those newly introduced 
practices by which the Republic had sought to mark China’s entry into the civilized ‘family of 
nations’ from 1912 onwards. For this reason, Republican governments had also propagated its use in 
religious ceremonies––as a replacement for the abolished kneeling worship.52 Finally, the party 
anthem and flag, both of which in turn became national symbols, replaced older markers by which 
China had symbolized its national sovereignty and thus claimed its rightful place within the system of 
nation-states.53 
Apart from national unification, the Weekly Remembrance also aimed at individual 
transformation by instilling in each participant a revolutionary work ethic. In the words of one of the 
Nationalists’ leading military figures, General He Yingqin ??? (1890-1987), “we should examine 
in detail the work we did ourselves in the last week, whether or not we worked hard for the party; … 
we ought to scrutinize ourselves, whether or not we fulfilled the mission the Party Leader gave us” 
and “we party members must examine ourselves whether or not we are already true revolutionary 
soldiers, whether or not we truly are hard-working party members.”54 Revolution was thus defined as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the GMD, Resolution (68th meeting), 
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?????.” Zhonghua Minguo fagui daquan (1936), p. 5721. 
50  For the change cf. “Xiuzheng zongli jinianzhou” (1937), Art. 4. 
51  Quoted here from Schoppa (2003), p. 69. For the drafting of the document see Bergère (1994), p. 463. 
52  See Harrison (2000), pp. 49-85; Chen Yunqian (2005), p. 67. 
53  Zarrow (2012), pp. 224-28; Harrison (2000), pp. 98-105 and 192-96; Pi Houfeng (1995). 
54  “Bangbu di-yi jinianzhou zhong He zong zhihui zhi baogao,” unidentified newspaper clipping, 16 November 
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labour, aiming at constructing a modern China that would become part of global modernity. GMD 
representatives also claimed that this work ethic was what fundamentally distinguished the Weekly 
Remembrance from Christian beliefs and practices.55 However, both the adoption of the weekly 
rhythm and the introduction of a fixed liturgy composed of body movements, common recitation, 
song and an exhortatory speech suggest that Christianity was a globalizing influence that both directly 
and indirectly shaped this political ritual. One of the few authors who openly acknowledged this was a 
young party official named Wu Xize ??? (*1915), who in a 1942 pamphlet noted the formal 
parallels between Christian service and the Weekly Remembrance and drew the following conclusion:  
 
Our country has always lacked a common religion like Western Christianity that could 
accommodate the hearts of men and be a place of hope for the spirit of our people. […] Now 
the Three People’s Principles have already become the central thought practiced by the entire 
people and all parties and factions. Hence we really shouldn’t hinder the Three People’s 
Principles replacing religion. Of course, the Three People’s Principles are a scientific doctrine, 
they are different from the doctrines of religion. But our believing in the Three People’s 
Principles needs precisely the spirit of religious belief; what is called religionization of belief, 
what is called the thought of the Three People’s Principles replacing religion means just that.56 
 
To what extent the cult of Sun Yatsen was able to penetrate and transform society is a matter of 
debate. The Weekly Remembrance, whose target group could be expected to have been loyal 
followers, gave grounds for many complaints. In particular, commentators bemoaned that despite the 
penalties with which absentees were threatened, attendance at the ritual was still poor. It seems, 
however, that violations were not systematically penalized.57 On the other hand, after the GMD had 
regrouped on Taiwan in 1949 it continued to practice the Weekly Remembrance as an attempt at its 
largely successful political consolidation.58 
In a global perspective, the Weekly Remembrance and other elements of the GMD’s political 
religion were the result of a global revolutionary project and an ensuing cultural transfer. The GMD 
no doubt was aware that the Chinese National Revolution was connected with revolutions elsewhere 
in the world.59 Clearly it was not a latecomer––both Soviet Communism and Italian Fascism (another 
likely model) were newly established regimes like that of the Nationalists. Moreover, the political 
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55  Ibid.; cf. also Anon. 1927, p. 7. For a more differentiated evaluation of Christianity cf. Wu Xize (1942), p. 3. 
56  Wu Xize (1942), pp. 3-4. 
57  Anon. (1927), p. 7; Lin Sen ?? to Kong Xiangxi ???, July 1939, AH, Xingzhengyuan ???, 068-
004. 
58  See, for example, Gu Weijun (1989), p. 238. 
59  Zhongguo Guomindang Zhejiang Sheng Dangwu Zhidao Weiyuanhui Xunlianbu (1929), pp. 23-24. 
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system created by the Guomindang developed roughly simultaneously or even prior to other quasi-
religious political movements with which it shared a number of features: Kemalism in Turkey60 and 
German National Socialism––the latter, along with Mussolini’s Fascism, would inspire the Chinese 
leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi ???, 1887-1975) in the 1930s. Hence, the development of the 
Sun Yatsen cult and other features of the regime should be seen as constitutive elements of a global 
process rather than a unidirectional cultural import. 
 
3. The Mao Cult as a Global Moment, 1960s and 1970s 
 
Like its predecessor, the Sun Yat-sen cult, the personality cult of Mao Zedong had its roots in 
Soviet influence in the 1920s and parallels that of Lenin (and, in Mao’s case, even more that of 
Stalin). Neither of the two remained completely faithful to the original blueprint; both made a unique 
contribution tailored to the conditions of Chinese society. However, whereas the Sun Yat-sen cult had 
few if any repercussions outside China, that of Mao found an echo across the world, creating 
something of a global moment in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The cult of Mao owed its emergence to a number of factors. Most fundamental of these was 
the transformation of the CCP from a liberal discussion circle in the May Fourth tradition into the 
tightly-knit, highly disciplined and thoroughly hierarchical organization it had become by the late 
1920s.61 As a consequence, the general line issued by the Party Central became sacrosanct: to oppose 
it was no longer simply an expression of dissent––it amounted to heresy. Political and military 
developments each played their role in enabling Mao’s rise to unquestioned leadership of the CCP, 
which took the better part of the decade between 1935 and 1945. Although some indications of the 
subsequent Mao cult appear as early as the late 1930s, the Rectification Movement of 1942 to 1944 
seems to have constituted a watershed in promoting Mao as a original and systematic Communist 
thinker in his own right and in making him the focus of political rituals. The first reference to Mao’s 
writings as a systematic body worthy of the name of ‘Thought of Comrade Mao Zedong’ (Mao 
Zedong tongzhi de sixiang ????????) dates from February 1941. About a year later, on 8 
February 1942, more than 1,000 people at the Communist headquarters in Yan’an celebrated ‘Zedong 
day,’ listening to biographical sketches of the party leader.62 During the Rectification Movement, 
party members for the first time studied Mao’s writings as “revelatory and ‘revealing’ texts” that 
“created ‘discourse communities with a transformational sense of their own difference, 
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messianic…”63 The anthem ‘The East is Red,’ whose lyrics were set to a folk song around the time of 
Mao’s ascension to chairmanship of the party in 1945, already features much of the imagery 
surrounding Mao in later years.64 Mao is hailed as a “great saviour” (da jiuxing ???, literally 
“saving star”) and “pathfinder” (dailuren ???) who loves the people; the sun, which would 
become one of the most frequently used tropes for Mao, is present as a symbol for both the man and 
the party. 
It is impossible here to trace in more detail the development of the Mao cult through the 
1950s and 1960s, nor to discuss the contributions of other party leaders and practices such as self-
criticism to the creation of a political religion by the Chinese Communists. By the same token, I am 
less interested in the ways the worship of Mao became a stand-in for religious practices associated 
with deities, eventually transforming the chairman––like Sun Yatsen before him––into a god of the 
folk-religious pantheon.65 Suffice it to say that the Mao cult was predicated on the notion of the 
transformative power of belief, both at the individual and social levels. During the Cultural 
Revolution in particular, propaganda emphasized the closeness of Chairman Mao, allowing him to 
penetrate into individuals’ thinking to a degree unknown for any previous political leader. As a well-
known song stated: 
The sun is reddest, / Chairman Mao is closest. 
Your brilliant thought / Will forever illuminate my [or: our] heart. 
The spring wind is warmest, / Chairman Mao is closest. 
Your revolutionary Party line / Will forever guide [my/our] journey. 
Your achievements are higher than the sky. 
Your loving kindness is deeper than the sea. 
The sun in my heart will never set. 
Your heart will forever be close to ours.66 
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Figure 1. Women xinzhong zuihong zuihongde hong taiyang Mao zhuxi he women xin lian xin ?们???红?
红?红?阳?????们?连? ?The reddest reddest red sun in our heart, Chairman Mao and us heart to 
heart], propaganda poster by Zhejiang Sheng Gongnongbing Meishu Chuangzuozu ???????????, 
January 1968, International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam), IISH collection, BG E3/712. 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, innumerable propaganda posters hammered the same point 
home (see, for example, fig. 1). The youthful Red Guards, who were the targets of this propaganda, 
responded with rituals of their own, including oaths of loyalty to the Chairman, an elevation of terror 
as a source of social change, a cult of physical strength, pilgrimages retracing episodes in Mao’s 
biography or providing the opportunity to see him (if only from a distance) and prescribed forms of 
penitence to rectify transgressions. 67  Certainly the Red Guards’ romanticist and voluntarist 
perspective on Mao was different to that of the Party establishment. But ultimately, rational and 
irrational elements in the Mao cult are hard to disentangle. A fine example is the story how People’s 
Liberation Army doctors performed miraculous cures on deaf-mutes by correctly applying Mao’s 
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doctrine on contradictions.68 
What is more interesting in the context of this article is that the Cultural Revolution should 
not be viewed in isolation. Rather, it formed part of a global wave of social upheavals and 
transformations that shook both the ‘developed’ nations of Europe and North America, the struggling 
nation-states of Latin America and the freshly decolonized Third World.69 The domestic causes of this 
upheaval were always complex and varied from country to country and from world region to world 
region. They were held together, however, by the common framework of the Cold War, which was 
compounded by the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, and the changes to the system of nation-states 
brought about by decolonization, both transformations that were changing the face of the globe. 
Within this context, Maoism could mean different things to different people, reflecting the more 
‘pragmatic’ or the more ‘charismatic’ aspects of Maoism (although in practice these aspects may have 
been hard to distinguish). In largely agriculture-based countries, it might serve as blueprint to a 
successful strategy of agrarian revolution and guerrilla warfare, sometimes succeeding in bringing 
together peasants and students. 70  For the educated urban youth, especially in the ‘Western’ 
hemisphere, Mao, along with Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969), Fidel Castro (*1927), Che Guevara (1928-
1967) and others became a key symbol in an emerging ‘third world-ism’ (tiers-mondisme), a growing 
concern with the problems faced by the developing world, the Vietnam War being just one example, 
albeit one of prime importance. Against this backdrop, Mao constituted a powerful counter-image 
with which to critique and provoke authorities and elder generations.71 
It has been argued that in its spread across the globe, Maoism proved to be an adaptable and 
malleable concept – to the extent that there was not one single Maoism, but a spectrum of different 
Maoisms.72 With regard to Western Europe in particular, scholars have pointed to the rather marginal 
if not entirely insignificant character of Maoist groups and their often highly selective adaptation of 
Mao’s thinking.73 The same appears to be true of Mao-oriented organizations in other parts of the 
world as well, and indeed few of them succeeded in seizing unchallenged state power, with the 
exception of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia between 1975 and 1978 and the Communist Party of 
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Nepal (Maoist) since 2006, the latter’s success being somewhat anachronistic. 74  However, 
overemphasizing the receiving end obscures the fact that the Chinese side took on an active role in 
this cultural transfer. In fact, the CCP leadership closely monitored protest movements in the world in 
the late 1960s, seeing China as the centre of the world revolution, and the Red Guards expressed a 
strong desire to export the revolution to the rest of the world.75 Most importantly, perhaps, a number 
of powerful media that spread the revolutionary message across the world immediately grew out of 
the Mao cult. These could serve as global icons of protest and revolution, lending themselves to 
adaptation in various local contexts.  
The first of these was the Little Red Book (Mao zhuxi yulu ?????, ‘Quotations from 
Chairman Mao’), published under the auspices of the People’s Liberation Army in 1964. Until 1971, 
about 110 million copies appeared in 36 languages (including a Braille version), the official version 
being supplemented by over 400 local editions.76 The Little Red Book was more than a collection of 
relevant Mao statements for every conceivable situation in life; its materiality served in itself as an 
icon to be presented ostentatiously. Nobody has appreciated the iconic quality inherent in the book’s 
materiality better than French director Jean-Luc Godard (*1930) in his 1967 film La Chinoise––
especially in the scene where copies of the book are flung at an American toy tank, stopping it 
instantly in its tracks.77 By contrast, a second publication, the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 
published in the early 1950s, provided fodder for the intellectual mind. And finally there was Mao’s 
image, popularized in many ways, not the least in the form of Mao badges that were worn as insignia 
of loyalty by demonstrating Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. These too made their way 
abroad; in 1968, the English-language magazine China Reconstructs reported how people across the 
world were craving for the precious button.78 Indeed, the two lines from the Beatles song ‘Revolution’ 
stating that “if you go carrying pictures of chairman Mao/You ain’t going to make it with anyone 
anyhow,” seem to allude directly to the practice of wearing Mao badges in Britain. 79  As 
representatives of popular counterculture, the Beatles, and especially John Lennon (1940-1980), 
displayed a high degree of ambivalence about a violent revolution in Chinese fashion. But Lennon 
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sported a Mao badge during a 1970 interview, justifying this on the grounds that Mao was “doing a 
good job.”80 
In the global moment created by the upsurge of political religion during the Cultural 
Revolution in China, Maoist media and iconography linked third-world revolutionaries with first-
world protest culture. To what extent the results can be classified as political religion is a matter of 
debate, the more so as they varied from place to place. Between 1967 and 1972 the Maoist splinter 
group popularly known as the Naxalites in India, basing themselves on the ‘Little Red Book’ as well 
as on Mao’s ‘Three Old Essays’ adopted Mao’s guerrilla tactics to wage a ‘people’s war’. Despite the 
tensions before and after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Naxalites regarded the Chinese leader as 
their chairman, beginning what one historian has called the “fanatical worshipping of Mao.”81 Indeed, 
Charu Mazumdar (1918-1972), chairman of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), which 
became the political driving force of the movement, employed an apocalyptic rhetoric, exhorting his 
student followers to have faith in Mao Zedong Thought, as it was “smashing the old world and 
building a new world”.82 Mazumdar called for the establishment of small work teams, each member 
equipped with a copy of the Quotations from Chairman Mao, who should share the hardships of poor 
and landless peasants while at the same time familiarizing them with the sayings of the Chinese 
leader. The Naxalites also made use of the symbolic materiality of the Quotations, introducing ‘red 
book marriages’ whereby a couple could declare themselves husband and wife by exchanging copies 
of the precious text in front of party members.83 Although the Naxalite guerrilla movement was 
suppressed in the 1970s, it has made a remarkable comeback since the early 2000s.84 Peru offers a 
similar example: Here in the 1970s, the guerrillas of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) developed 
a personality cult reminiscent of Mao around their leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso (aka Presidente 
Gonzalez, *1934), who became known to his followers as puka inti, Quechua for “Red Sun,” while 
some nicknamed him more disrespectfully “shampoo,” for his alleged ability at brainwashing 
people.85 The Shining Path also followed the Chinese example by making use of big-character posters 
of sorts and even reciting CCP songs in Mandarin.86 
In the West European student movement too, adaptations of Maoist ideas and paraphernalia 
also gave rise to notions of palingenetic renewal. Writing in retrospect, the former German activist 
Gerd Koenen (*1944) almost echoes Eric Voegelin when he speaks of “a certain apocalyptic 
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thinking” exhibited by the movement. China, Koenen goes on to argue, made it possible for German 
youths to radically reinvent themselves, challenging the older war generation and escaping from the 
seemingly inexorable rift imposed by the logic of the Cold War. Maoism perfectly fit the idea that 
somehow there existed a link between third-world liberation movements and the students’ attempts at 
reinventing and refashioning their own society.87 Echoing another icon of CCP history, student leader 
Rudi Dutschke (1940-1979) called in February 1968 for a “long march through institutions” that 
would lead to the creation of counter-institutions or “liberated zones” within bourgeois society. 
Although at surface level, Dutschke refers to Maoism as a pragmatic strategy, his ideas of anti-
bourgeois forms of social life also appears to foreshadow a complete renewal of society. It is quite 
possible that related experiments with communal forms of living also had their roots in the study of 
Chinese Communist texts.88 
Thus China became a blueprint for radical attempts at renovating society––apocalyptic in that 
they could only fully be realized through the overthrow of the existing social order. At the same time, 
China was itself a utopia concretized, as one widely read book argued––a place where human beings 
and their needs were at the centre of politics and administration.89 Surprisingly, this utopia appealed 
not only to the New Left, but also to conservatives such as the former French minister of education 
Alain Peyrefitte (1925-1999), the German journalist Klaus Mehnert (1906-1984) or his Swedish 
colleague Olof Lagercrantz (1911-2002), all of whom visited China in the early 1970s. In their 
travelogues, they describe China as something akin to an earthly paradise, where the populace scorn 
wealth, where bureaucracy is reduced to a minimum, where direct democracy is implemented and 
where the authorities encourage innovation and experiment. These are echoes of the writings of Agnes 
Smedley (1892-1950), Anna Louise Strong (1885-1970) and Edgar Snow (1905-1972), who had 
begun to sing Mao’s praises as early as the late 1920s and early 1930s.90 
Whereas most of the Maoist movements in Asia and Latin America were sooner or later 
repressed by military force (in the case of the Khmer Rouge, by the army of a neighbouring country, 
Vietnam), the honeymoon of young Western Europeans and North Americans with China came to an 
end through developments in China itself. Fissures appeared as early as 1972 as a result of China’s 
rapprochement with the United States. They became visible in the wake of US President Nixon’s visit 
to China in February 1972, which publicly and ostensibly involved Mao’s persona. In response to this 
event, a booklet accompanying a record of the German band Ton Steine Scherben released in the same 
year featured a portrait of Mao with the caption “Mao, Mao, why have you forsaken us?”91 Here, the 
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religious allusion was used to express disappointment at the Chinese leader’s retreat from his 
revolutionary line. When following the death of Mao, the PRC abandoned his radical policies and 
walked down the capitalist road that Mao had so fervently spoken out against, China ceased to be 
viewed as the paradise of the workers and peasants that could serve as a model for a radical and 
miraculous restructuring of ‘Western’ societies.  
As the global moment to which the Mao cult had so greatly contributed gradually petered out 
across the globe, it also did so in China––with some qualifications, however. Mao was not completely 
dismantled by the new CCP leadership, and various waves of nostalgia confirm the lingering 
impression the former Chairman has made on the Chinese population. Films starring Mao’s 
doppelganger Gu Yue ?? (1937-2005), the sale of kitschy Mao memorabilia from the first decades 
of the PRC, and forms of red tourism to important places in his life confirm this. The Chairman Mao 
Memorial Hall on Tian’anmen ??? Square in Beijing, in particular, became a site of pilgrimage 
for the Chinese population.92 However, for the time being the Mao cult ceased to function as a 
political platform, as the CCP turned to other sources of legitimacy. 
 
4. Vestiges of Political Religion in the Post-Mao Era, 1976-present 
 
Despite this enduring popularity of certain aspects of the Mao cult in the years after his death, 
the leadership of party and state quickly embarked on a different course. Its attempts to humanize 
political power holders was summed up succinctly by then head of state Ye Jianying ??? (1897-
1986) in his speech on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the People’s Republic in October 
1979:  
 
According to Lenin, those who lead a proletarian party and a Communist state usually are not 
individuals, but a collective composed of several people referred to as leaders. Organizations 
at all levels need their leaders… Leading personalities are not gods, they cannot but have 
defects and [commit] mistakes, [hence] they should not be deified.93  
 
As well as distancing themselves from the Mao cult, the new leaders also sought to 
undermine its ideological underpinnings. For Deng Xiaoping ??? (1904-1997), the emerging 
paramount leader, the core of the Mao Zedong ideas consisted not in the concept of class struggle, but 
in ‘seeking truth from facts’ (shishi qiu shi ????). In establishing practice as the sole criterion of 
truth, Deng was supported by Hu Yaobang ??? (1915-1989), who until his dismissal as Secretary 
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General of the CCP in 1987 was one of his closest political associates. Deng and his followers 
succeeded in establishing a discursive framework that forced party cadres to declare themselves in 
favour of the new political line of the party, no matter whether they were convinced of it or not.94 This 
shift paved the way for China’s new economic policy; at the same time, it was a major departure from 
the emphasis on individual faith and inner transformation characteristic of the Mao era. Propagating 
the ‘liberation of thought’ (jiefang sixiang ????), the CCP under Deng had effectively been 
stripped off all signs of political religion. 
The approach of the early Deng Xiaoping years was not to last, however. From the late 1970s, 
the CCP struggled with political and social dissent embodied, among others, in the democracy 
movements of 1978/79 and 1989. The brief appearance of the ‘Goddess of Democracy’ in 
Tian’anmen Square in late May and early June 1989 was a double appropriation, drawing on a global 
symbol of individual freedom and democratic government, the Statue of Liberty in New York, which 
itself merges religious imagery into a secular political discourse. Other global symbols included the 
‘International’ as the hymn of the movement and the wearing of white headbands, adopted from pro-
democracy protests in Korea and the Philippines. At the same time, the Goddess’ seeming dialogue 
with the portrait of Mao hanging from Tian’anmen Gate, captured in photographs at the time, could 
also be read as invoking the messianism associated with Mao against a dictatorial and corrupt party 
elite.95 
In reaction to the two democracy movements, which it suppressed ruthlessly, the CCP tried to 
redefine both its ideology and its position within the world at large. The Four Basic Principles, laid 
down in 1979, contained those features that the party was determined to hold on to: Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the leadership of the CCP, Socialism and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. The formulation, however, was vague and more geared towards preventing the people 
from challenging the party-state. 96  In 1992, three years after the brutal crackdown on the 
demonstrators at Tian’anmen Square, the CCP officially adopted Deng Xiaoping theory, which 
included as developmental goal a “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (you Zhongguo tese de 
shehuizhuyi ?????????? ). This formula pointed to a specific Chinese goal of 
modernization that would resemble neither Soviet-style socialism nor the liberal-democratic 
capitalism of the West. The deliberate camouflaging of the ‘Western’ origins of socialism was an 
echo of the late-nineteenth century ti-yong ?? formula, conceived by Confucian scholars in an 
attempt to strengthen China by importing ‘Western’ technology while at the same keeping ‘Western’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  For this shift see Zhang Wei-Wei (1996), pp. 23-28. 
95  Wagner (1992 b), pp. 330-42. 
96  Zhang Wei-wei (1996), pp. 29-32. 
71	  
	  
ideas at bay.97 
Since the early 1990s, successive CCP leaders as well as party propaganda have introduced 
comprehensive interpretations of China’s past, present and future that to some extent relate the idea of 
a fundamental transformation of Chinese society. Perhaps the most obvious example is the officially 
sponsored resurgence of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s. A case in point is the well-known 1994 
poster series on ‘patriotic education.’98 The four posters in the series address different themes: pride in 
China’s ancient civilization, indignation at the unforgettable experience of China’s humiliation by 
imperialism, fond memories of China’s revolution from 1911 to the Communist takeover in 1949 and 
finally, satisfaction at modern technology, which will catapult China to the forefront of the twenty-
first century world. Whilst identifying the enemies who have hindered China’s progress, the end result 
will be a new nation whose progress is symbolized by the ability to explore outer space. 
Interestingly, a similar trajectory, albeit with a different focus, can be found in Jiang Zemin’s 
??? (*1926) explanations of his ‘Three Represents’ (San ge daibiao ????), promulgated in 
2000. Jiang, who succeeded Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader, divides the “more than seventy-year 
history” of the CCP into the three stages of revolution, reconstruction and reform. In each of these 
stages, the party “always has represented the demands of China’s progressive productive forces, 
represented the direction of the advance of China’s progressive culture, represented the fundamental 
interests of the broadest [masses] of the people.”99 These ‘Three Represents,’ according to Jiang, are 
also the key to China’s future development, enabling the reconstruction of the party – which should be 
enabled to accept capitalists as members – and the “self-perfection and development” of a “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.”100 Jiang thus presents the sanitized history of an unblemished Party, 
while at the same time connecting it with the promise of a perfect future. 
Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao ??? (*1942) chose yet another approach, attempting to even 
out social imbalances that have arisen as a consequence of the reform process: by declaring a 
moderately affluent society (xiaokang shehui ????) as China’s developmental goal, he borrowed 
heavily from Confucian utopianism and in particular Kang Youwei’s ??? (1858-1927) Datong shu 
??? (The book of Supreme Unity).101 At the same time, his Eight Honours and Eight Shames (Ba 
rong ba chi ????), proclaimed two years later, offer a moral code for every citizen. Its elements 
––such as love of the country and serving the people, embracing science and education, hard work, 
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respect for the law and discipline––are adapted to serve the vision of a modernizing China at the 
outset of the twenty-first century. A DVD from the early Hu Jintao era underlays pictures of a 
peaceful, harmonious and modern Chinese society with songs incorporating the eight maxims.102 
Though these attempts differ in their outlook, all of them are underpinned by a tightly 
circumscribed role of history in public life. In Communist China, understanding the past has always 
been placed under party supervision; at any point in recent history, its interpretation has followed the 
official party line of the day. With other symbols of Communist ideology on decline, the sacralization 
of Chinese history was brought more sharply into relief. Its essence is neatly captured by a 
propaganda poster issued in 1984 (Fig. 2): At the centre, the image shows a hand holding a book – a 
direct reference to the shape of the Little Red Book, except that this time, it is a Modern History of 
China covered in blue. Yellow waves alluding to sunbeams as well as scenes from the Monument to 
the People’s Heroes on Tian’anmen Square are both reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. At the 
same time, the caption evokes the connection between history and patriotism: “To love the country 
one must first know its history––the deeper the knowledge, the more eager the love.” The religious 
imagery surrounding the themes of history and patriotism endows this poster with a significance 
beyond its original context, the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. 
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Figure 2: Ai guo shouxian you zhi guo––zhi zhi yuhen ai zhi yu qie ???????––???????? [To 
love the country one must first know its history––the deeper the knowledge, the more eager the love], 
propaganda poster by Sha De’an ??? and Li Yang ??, 1984, International Institute for Social History 
(Amsterdam), Stefan Landsberger collection, BG E13/489. 
 
The CCP has taken great pains to immunize Chinese history against unwelcome 
interpretations, both domestically and abroad. A particularly sensitive issue is the history of 
imperialism precisely because it has a global dimension involving other parties. In the 1990s, the 
concept of ‘national humiliation’ (guochi) made a spectacular comeback across all kinds of media, 
indicating a discursive shift from heroic resistance (which had dominated the memory of imperialism 
under Mao) to Chinese suffering and victimization.103 The conflict between China and the Vatican in 
October 2000 offers a good example of how the CCP has tried to defend its history against competing 
interpretations in an increasingly globalizing world. It revolved around the canonization of 120 
Chinese martyrs by Pope John Paul II (1920-2005) on 1 October of that year. The date was chosen by 
the church because it is the feast of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897), a patron saint of foreign 
missions.104 As the majority of the 120 persons selected for canonization were Chinese, the ceremony 
can also be viewed as reflecting the growing recognition of non-European contributions to a global 
church. From the perspective of CCP, however, this was an interference with the official Chinese 
interpretation of history, the more so as the ceremony was scheduled for Chinese National Day. From 
late September into the first week of October, Chinese media conducted a massive campaign against 
the Vatican, no doubt with official backing. China’s official ‘patriotic’ religious associations were 
also quoted as supporting the stance of party and government.105 Newspaper articles denounced the 
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canonization of the “so-called ‘saints’,” arguing that the Vatican was consciously attempting to 
manipulate and falsify history. The understanding of history underpinning the press coverage leaves 
no room for different interpretations; deviations from the one true version sanctioned by the party are 
viewed as distortion, fabrication, as a “provocation of the Chinese people” or even as “anti-Chinese 
activities (fan Hua huodong ????).”106 At the same time, the ‘correct’ interpretation of history, in 
which professional historians joined the journalists, was based on the vilification of Catholic 
missionaries. These had committed ‘crimes’ (zui ?) against the Chinese people: not content with 
supporting imperialist politics and forcibly occupying land on which to build churches, they had 
committed more heinous misdeeds, abusing, seducing or raping Chinese women (in particular 
Christians).107 Finally, commentators strongly emphasized the difference between the China of today 
and that of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The message is that China was weak then, but 
is much stronger today and will be able to successfully resist any encroachments from outside forces. 
It goes without saying that such a discourse is not only about the past. It is about China’s role 
in an increasingly globalizing world. And it must be seen in connection with events such as the 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the ensuing outrage in China, or the 
anti-Japanese demonstrations across China in 2005.108 In this logic, if China is striving to attain a 
leading global role, it must overcome the “containment policy” (ezhi zhengce ????) of the West 
and in particular the United States. This view emanates not only from government propaganda, but 
also from more popular expressions of nationalism, such as the 1996 bestseller China Can Say No, 
which is itself modelled on a Japanese pamphlet.109 What is left of the apocalyptic dimension of 
Chinese politics, then, is the necessity of overcoming external adversaries in order to emerge as a 
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truly global player. 
In the post-Mao era, the CCP has replaced the ‘faith’ in the political leadership that was such 
a defining feature of Mao’s rule with a more empirically oriented and increasingly technocratic 
understanding of politics. The party has promulgated a new code of social ethics aiming at the 
creation of social harmony through correct practice––a strategy that, it is true, borrows heavily from 
Confucianism and is more in line with Chinese modes of ‘doing religion’ than with the faith-based 
understanding of religion adopted from the ‘West.’110 The same can be said of the (propagandistic) 
attempts of creating a middle-class society, which is both a realistic strategy and draws on Confucian-
inspired utopianism. At the same time, the Party has sanitized its own history and sacralized that of 
China at large. This can be viewed as a response to the domestic and international challenges in a 
rapidly globalizing world. While it echoes some of the defining features of political religion – in 
particular the immaculate image of the Party and its leadership, the symbolism surrounding the nation 
and the notion that China must overcome contending forces to attain its rightful place in the world –, 
it bears more resemblance to the pre-1920 period than to Guomindang China or the Mao era. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The trajectory of political religion in twentieth-century China owes much to China’s standing 
in the world at large. It grew out of attempts at overcoming China’s perceived international weakness, 
which was always bound up with the country’s domestic problems. At the same time, it can be viewed 
as a specifically Chinese response to one of the great global challenges of the twentieth century: the 
decline of a transcendent legitimacy of political authority. In the 1920s, China became part of a global 
revolutionary project that sought to unite the oppressed peoples of the world under the leadership of 
the Soviet Union against capitalist imperialism. Although this project was soon abandoned by the 
Soviet leadership itself, it had a lasting impact on Chinese politics. The Nationalists, who had severed 
their ties with Soviet Communism as early as the late 1920s, adapted the Soviet model of political 
religion and mixed it with Christian influences, despite explicitly disavowing the latter. For the 
Guomindang, faith in the late leader Sun Yatsen and in the party ideology he created was essential in 
bringing about a domestically unified and internationally strengthened China. Political rituals centred 
around the memory of Sun and geared towards creating a revolutionary work ethic became the means 
to inculcate this faith amongst the political and social elites, whose successful mobilization would 
enable China to become part of a global modernity. However, this also required struggles to overcome 
obstacles and foes in order to win through to the ultimate goal––a vision which constitutes the 
‘apocalyptic’ element of the GMD’s political religion. 
In principle, the political religion of the CCP propagated throughout the Mao era stemmed 
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from the same ideological background and served the same goals. But not only did they penetrate 
more deeply and more effectively into Chinese society, they also became part of a global moment in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This united different constituencies––a youthful urban counterculture in the 
‘West,’ revolutionary guerrilla movements in the Third World. While for the latter, adopting Mao’s 
strategies seemed to reflect a straightforward logic, this was not the case for the former. In Western 
Europe and North America, an increasing receptivity towards the emerging Third World played a far 
greater role. The politically religious dimension Maoism could inscribe itself into this trend. But this 
process was not exclusively determined by the receiving end: China’s essential contribution to the 
revolutionary global moment consisted in producing powerful symbols––most notably Mao’s portrait 
and the Little Red Book as well as other Mao writings––that had an appeal for different 
constituencies. 
As political religions, the ideologies of the GMD and of the CCP in the Mao era shared a 
number of characteristics: Both placed a strong emphasis on faith and invididual as well as collective 
transformation, based on the cult of a political leader. In abandoning these, the post-Mao Communist 
leadership took an altogether different approach. However, the global environment within which it 
operated looked more akin to the situation of Guomindang China than to the global moment of the 
1960s and 1970s. Although many emerging economies could look to the Chinese developmental 
model for guidance and ‘Western’ enterprises could not resist the allure of the Chinese market, CCP 
ideology was hardly a selling point. ‘Western’ public opinion in particular, having somewhat 
belatedly discovered the atrocities during Mao’s reign, was increasingly hostile, pointing to China’s 
human rights violations as well as its increasing military build-up and heightened nationalism. In this 
context, vestiges of political religion continue to exist in the form of a whitewashed party history, the 
sacralization of national history, the apocalyptic identification of enemies and obstacles to be 
overcome, the propagation of a moral code that can unify the population domestically and strengthen 
China vis-à-vis the challenges from abroad and finally the vision of a harmonious future society and a 
rise of China’s power at the global level. 
With the possible exception of the democratic movement of 1989, the Mao cult ceased to be 
used as a political platform after the chairman’s death in 1976 – until very recently: When the party 
chairman of Chongqing ??  Bo Xilai ???  (*1949) initiated a “red culture movement” 
reminiscent of Mao-era mass campaigns in 2011, he may well have intended this to be part of a bid 
for power at the Party’s centre.111 Although Bo’s expulsion from the party the following year put a 
stop to his personal ambitions, it would seem that the new party chairman, Xi Jinping ???, who 
took office in late 2012, has also appropriated elements from the Mao cult. In June 2013, the party 
launched a “campaign to realize the Party’s mass line education” (dang de qunzong luxiang jiaoyu 
shixian yundong ???????????? ), with Xi himself presiding over self-criticism 
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sessions. A new edition of the Quotations from Chairman Mao is scheduled for November of the 
same year. This is certainly more than a move to appease left-wing adherents of Bo Xilai.112 Each of 
Mao’s successors has sought to make his imprint on the ideological development and––more broadly 
speaking––the political culture of party, state and society. And for Xi, elements of Maoist politics 
may appear as an expedient tool to distinguish himself from his predecessors and establish his 
authority as a leader. All of this clearly does not imply a return to the class struggle of the Mao era. 
But it indicates how elements of political religion inherited from the twentieth century may still shape 
China’s contemporary politics. What is also obvious is that in shaping its political culture, present-day 
China can rely on a purely national heritage. The global processes by which the idea of political 
ideologies as beliefs was introduced in China as well as the ideas of apocalypse and palingenesis that 
the Mao cult radiated back into the wider world now appear to belong to history. 
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